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Tolling the Deadline for Appealing in Absentia
Deportation Orders Due to Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel
Damon W. Taaffet
Ruben Lopez, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United
States illegally and retained an attorney to assist him in obtaining a
work permit. He paid $350 for the representation. Noel, his attorney,
told Lopez to bring any Immigration and Naturalization Service
("INS") correspondence to him immediately so that he might take
care of it.
Instead of seeking a work permit as Lopez requested, Noel filed
an application for political asylum. When Lopez received notice of his
asylum hearing, Noel told him that he need not appear at the hearing,
and charged him another $100. Lopez heeded his attorney's advice
and did not attend the hearing, but neither did Noel, and Lopez re-
ceived notice that his case had been referred to an Immigration Judge
("IJ") for a deportation hearing. Again, Noel advised Lopez that he
would appear on his behalf, and Lopez paid him an additional $400.
Again, neither Lopez nor Noel appeared at the deportation hearing,
and the IJ issued a deportation order in absentia.
Upon receiving notice of the IJ's order, Lopez became suspicious
and confronted Noel. It turned out that Noel was actually a notary
public, not an attorney. Lopez immediately retained new counsel and
filed an appeal due to the "exceptional circumstance[ ]"2 of ineffective
assistance of counsel, but it was too late-the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act ("INA") § 1229a's 180-day deadline for appealing depor-
tation orders' had lapsed.
In such cases, aliens frequently ask the court to "equitably toll"
the filing deadline. Equitable tolling "ensures fundamental fairness"
by allowing courts to extend statutory deadlines when justice so re-
quires.' Today, the outcome of such a tolling request would likely de-
pend on what court hears the appeal. The anti-tolling courts, epito-
mized by the Eleventh Circuit, view the filing deadline as a jurisdic-
t B.A. 1999, Swarthmore College; J.D. Candidate 2002, The University of Chicago.
1 See Lopez v INS, 184 F3d 1097, 1098 (9th Cir 1999). This scenario borrows the facts of
that case.
2 8 USC § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i) (1994 & Supp 1999).
3 Id.
4 Morris v Government Development Bank of Puerto Rico, 27 F3d 746,750 (1st Cir 1994).
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tional limit rather than a statute of limitations.5 Since jurisdictional
limits prevent a court from hearing a case on its merits, adherents to
this view hold that courts cannot toll the filing deadline regardless of
any consequent injustice.!
The Ninth Circuit stands in sharp contrast to the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, holding that Section 1229a is a tollable statute of limitations, and
that alleged fraud, an extreme form of ineffective assistance, can be
sufficient to justify tolling.7 It explicitly rejects the Eleventh Circuit's
finding of a jurisdictional limit within the INA. The First Circuit has
also signaled its receptiveness to tolling, so long as a petitioner is duly
diligent.8
Analyzing equitable tolling's propriety in the deportation context
thus entails two distinct inquiries. First, is the filing deadline properly
viewed as a jurisdictional limit per the Eleventh Circuit,' or a statute
of limitations per the Ninth Circuit?"0 Second, if the Ninth Circuit is
correct and courts possess the power to toll equitably, should they toll
for appeals that are tardy due to alleged ineffective assistance of
counsel?
This Comment proposes that in situations where an alien or his
attorney receives notice of a pending deportation hearing, courts
should draw a misfeasance-nonfeasance distinction and equitably toll
the deadline only when an attorney's material misrepresentations
proximately cause an alien to miss his hearing. This approach balances
two somewhat competing ideals: that a client should be able to rely on
his attorney's reasonable representations without fear of penalty, and
that a client should actively pursue his own case.
The Comment is divided into three Parts. Part I discusses the
statutory provisions relevant to the analysis. Part II argues that the
INA's 180-day appeal deadline is properly viewed as a tollable statute
of limitations rather than a jurisdictional limit. The analysis proceeds
by examining the statute's text, legislative history, and purpose, and it
concludes that there is no indication that Congress intended to curb
courts' equitable powers when hearing deportation appeals. Finally,
Part III assumes that courts possess the power to toll the 180-day fil-
ing deadline and argues that they should apply equitable tolling prin-
ciples when an alien's attorney induces him not to attend a deporta-
5 See, for example, Anin v Reno, 188 F3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir 1999) (holding that the
INS's 180-day filing deadline provision is "jurisdictional and mandatory"), citing Kamara v INS,
149 F3d 904,906 (8th Cir 1998).
6 See Anin, 188 F3d at 1278.
7 Lopez, 184 F3d at 1100 (holding that fraud by a notary public posing as an attorney is
sufficient to toll the deadline).
8 Jobe v INS, 238 F3d 96,99 (1st Cir 2001).
9 See Anin, 188 F3d at 1273.
10 See Lopez, 184 F3d at 1100.
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tion hearing and he consequently misses the appeal deadline. In sum-
mary, the weight of the evidence suggests that courts can toll the filing
deadline, and equity mandates that they do so when an alien alleges
that ineffective assistance proximately caused him to miss his appeals
deadline.
I. EQUITABLE TOLLING AND THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY
AcT's FILING DEADLINES
Equitable tolling is a judicially created doctrine that allows courts
to extend statutory deadlines when justice so requires. Among the
three courts of appeals that have addressed the question of when
courts should toll Section 1229a's filing deadline, three conclusions
emerge. The Eleventh Circuit holds that the deadline is jurisdictional,
and courts therefore cannot toll it. The First Circuit suggests that the
deadline may be tollable if a petitioner is suitably diligent. The Ninth
Circuit goes the furthest, holding that the deadline is tollable and that
alleged fraud is sufficient to merit tolling.
A. Statutes of Limitations and Equitable Tolling
Statutes of limitations are inherently harsh because they "cut off
a person's rights without regard to the merits of the claim."" They are
also somewhat arbitrary because there is usually no particularly com-
pelling reason to have an appeals period of any given length. 2 In the
INA's case, for example, it is difficult to explain why a 180-day dead-
line is superior to one of 170 or 190 days.
Nonetheless, statutes of limitations are an invaluable part of the
judicial system. They help to ensure that the finder of fact will not be
crippled by the loss of key evidence," and in so doing, they "maintain
the integrity of a statute."" Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court
11 Richard Parker and Ugo Colella, Revisiting Equitable Tolling and the Federal Tort
Claims Act. The Impact of Brockamp and Beggerly, 29 Seton Hall L Rev 885,886 (1999).
12 See United States v Locke, 471 US 84,94 (1985) (noting "the inherent arbitrariness of fil-
ing deadlines").
13 Lyman Johnson argues:
[S]tatutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in the law. They
are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence .... An important pub-
lic policy lies at their foundation. Among other things, statutes of limitation make the dis-
covery and fact-finding tasks associated with litigation more reliable because courts are
freed from having to deal with cases in which the search for truth may be seriously im-
paired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading
memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise.
Lyman Johnson, Securities Fraud and the Mirage of Repose, 1992 Wis L Rev 607,632.
14 Salois v Dime Savings Bank of New York, 128 F3d 20,25 (1st Cir 1997) (explaining both
that equitable tolling is applied to prevent unjust results and that courts have taken a narrow
view of exceptions to the limitations period), quoting King v California, 784 F2d 910,915 (9th Cir
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has emphasized that statutes of limitations "are primarily designed to
assure fairness to defendants,"" because eventually "the right to be
free of stale claims ... comes to prevail over the right to prosecute
them."'6
Despite the benefits that come with laying a claim permanently
to rest, Congress has recognized that, in certain instances, courts
should use their equitable powers to prevent cases of obvious injustice
that might arise from mechanically applying a statute of limitations.
The equitable tolling doctrine recognizes that due to the inherent im-
precision of statutory phrasing, in certain cases the "rigid application"
of the limitation period would be unfair and contrary to legislative in-
tent.'7 In such cases, the doctrine allows courts to "ensure fundamental
fairness" by extending statutory time limits when justice so requires.'8
Equitable tolling finds its roots in Bailey v Glover,'9 a Supreme
Court case from 1875 dealing with a limitation period prescribed in
the 1867 Bankruptcy Act. In that case, the Court noted that a person
who concealed his fraud until the statute of limitations had run could
effectively insulate himself from liability, and therefore it extended the
Bankruptcy Act deadline to prevent such injustice."
More recently, in Holmberg v Armbrecht," the Supreme Court
universalized the doctrine, holding that it should be "read into every
federal statute of limitation."" As Judge Posner explains, in the mod-
ern day, equitable tolling is often invoked when a prospective litigant
"simply ... cannot with due diligence obtain information essential to
bringing a suit."" The Supreme Court has cautioned that federal
courts should extend such equitable relief "only sparingly,"2 but courts
have found the doctrine applicable in myriad settings, including
1986).
15 Burnett v New York Central Railroad Co, 380 US 424,428 (1965).
16 Order of Railroad Telegraphers v Railway Express Agency, Inc, 321 US 342,349 (1944).
17 Shendock v Director, Office of Worker's Compensation Programs, 893 F2d 1458,1462 (3d
Cir 1990) (noting that Congress can grant courts discretion to consider particular circumstances
of a case so as to toll a statute of limitations).
18 Morris v Government Development Bank of Puerto Rico, 27 F3d 746,750 (1st Cir 1994).
19 88 US (21 Wall) 342 (1875).
20 Id at 349-50.
21 327 US 392 (1946).
22 Id at 397.
23 Wolin v Smith Barney Inc, 83 F3d 847,852 (7th Cir 1989) (explaining that tolling is likely
to arise in a fraud case). See also Weddel v Secretary of Health and Human Services, 100 F3d 929,
931 (Fed Cir 1996) (stating that "[tihe doctrine of equitable tolling stops the running of the stat-
ute of limitation if, despite all due diligence, plaintiffs are unable to obtain essential information
concerning the existence of their claim").
24 Irwin v Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 US 89, 96 (1990) (denying equitable tolling
in "a garden variety claim of excusable neglect").
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Title VII suits," habeas petitions,26 and Truth in Lending Act filings.
Courts generally divide these "justifiable tolling" situations into
two categories. In the first, the defendant has committed fraud or has
fraudulently concealed the basis for the plaintiffs claim.' In the sec-
ond, extraordinary circumstances beyond the plaintiff's control pre-
vent him from timely bringing his action.9 Into this latter "honest de-
fendant" group fall such disparate cases as sudden military rule,3° a pe-
titioner's insanity,3 a former attorney's leaving unusable work product
for replacement counsel,3 and a petitioner whose mental incompe-
tence rendered him unable to assist in his own defense.3 Equitable
tolling has recently become very important in the immigration-
deportation context, where meeting a deadline can literally make the
difference between remaining in the United States and deportation.
B. Immigration and Nationality Act
The INS conducts deportation proceedings pursuant to the
Immigration and Nationality Act. 3 Section 1229(a)(1) provides that in
removal proceedings under Section 1229a, "written notice shall be
given in person to the alien, or, if personal service is not practicable,
25 See Zipes v Trans World Airlines, Inc, 455 US 385, 393 (1982) (finding that the filing
deadline for a Title VII discrimination claim with the EEOC is subject to equitable tolling).
26 See Valverde v Stinson, 224 F3d 129,133 (2d Cir 2000) (holding that a habeas corpus pe-
tition may be equitably tolled under "extraordinary circumstances"). See also Helton v Secretary
for Department of Corrections, 233 F3d 1322,1325-26 (1 1th Cir 2000) (finding that equitable toll-
ing allowed consideration of untimely habeas petition).
27 See Ellis v General Motors Acceptance Corp, 160 F3d 703, 708 (11th Cir 1998) (finding
statute of limitations in Truth in Lending Act subject to equitable tolling); Ramadan v Chase
Manhattan Corp, 156 F3d 499,504 (3d Cir 1998) (same).
28 See, for example, Barrett v United States, 689 F2d 324, 327-30 (2d Cir 1982) (tolling be-
cause defendant's fraudulent conduct prevented plaintiff from timely pressing his claim).
29 Bruce A. McGovern, The New Provision for Tolling Limitations Periods for Seeking Tax
Refunds: Its History, Operation and Policy, and Suggestions for Reform, 65 Mo L Rev 797, 807
(2000) (discussing justifications for tolling).
30 See Forti v Suarez-Mason, 672 F Supp 1531, 1550-51 (N D Cal 1987) (tolling due to mili-
tary seizure of power and subsequent restriction of access to fair adjudication).
31 See Nunnally v MacCausland, 996 F2d 1, 5 (1st Cir 1993) (allowing tolling of filing pe-
riod due to mental illness); Hood v Sears Roebuck and Co, 168 F3d 231, 232-33 (5th Cir 1999)
(same).
32 See Calderon v United States District Court for the Central District of California, 128 F3d
1283, 1289 (9th Cir 1997) (allowing tolling where petition was pursued diligently but work prod-
uct was unusable by replacement counsel).
33 See Stoll v Runyon, 165 F3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir 1999) (tolling in a sexual harassment
case where alleged harassment impaired the plaintiffs ability to communicate with her male at-
torney).
34 8 USC §§ 1229 et seq (1994 & Supp 1999).
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through service by mail to the alien or the alien's counsel of record, if
any."35
Deportation is technically a civil proceeding,6 so there is no Sixth
Amendment right to counsel," but the Act provides that "the alien
shall have the privilege of being represented, at no expense to the
Government, by counsel of the alien's choosing who is authorized to
practice in such proceedings." The Act also stipulates that in this pro-
ceeding, an alien shall have "a reasonable opportunity to examine the
evidence against [him], to present evidence on [his] own behalf, and to
cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government.""
These provisions clearly demonstrate that Congress was con-
cerned with providing aliens with some Fifth Amendment due process
protections," but Congress did not create unconditional privileges. If
an alien fails to secure counsel within the allotted period, the Attorney
General may initiate deportation proceedings against him despite his
lack of representation." Similarly, if the INS gives an alien or his at-
torney notice per Section 1229(a) and the alien fails to attend his de-
portation hearing, he can "be ordered removed in absentia if the Ser-
vice establishes by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that
the written notice was so provided and that the alien is removable."2
Once an IJ issues an in absentia deportation order, it may be re-
scinded in only two ways: upon a motion filed within 180 days if the
failure to appear was due to "exceptional circumstances,',43 or "upon a
35 The removal proceedings are currently codified at 8 USC § 1229a (1994 & Supp 1996).
In 1996, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996, Pub L No 104-208, 110 Stat 3009 (1996). Prior to this revision, Section 1229a had been codi-
fied almost verbatim at 8 USC § 1252b (1994). The Act repealed Section 1252b and recodified it
at Section 1229a. 8 USC § 1229a (Supp 1996). Although the cases predating the Act refer to the
deportation provision as Section 1252b, this Comment will refer to Section 1229a in all instances.
The reader should treat them as synonymous.
36 See Woodby v INS, 385 US 276, 285 (1966) ("To be sure, a deportation proceeding is not
a criminal prosecution."), citing Harisiades v Shaughnessy, 342 US 580,594 (1952) ("Deportation,
however severe its consequences, has been consistently classified as a civil rather than a criminal
proceeding."); Rios-Berrios v INS, 776 F2d 859, 862 (9th Cir 1985) (noting that "a deportation
hearing is not a criminal matter"); Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment:
Why at Least Some of the Constitution's Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 Admin L
Rev 305,307 (2000) (stating that "[t]he order of deportation is not a punishment for crime"), cit-
ing Fong Yue Ting v United States, 149 US 698,730 (1893).
37 US Const Amend VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ...
to have the Assistance of Counsel.").
38 8 USC § 1229a(b)(4)(A).
39 Id § 1229a(b)(4)(B).
40 See Rios-Berrios, 776 F2d at 862 (holding under general Fifth Amendment principles
that "[ain alien is entitled to due process ... in his deportation hearing").
41 8 USC § 1229(b)(3).
42 Id § 1229a(b)(5)(A).
43 Id § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i). "Exceptional circumstances" are defined as those that are both
compelling and "beyond the control of the alien," such as a serious illness or the death of a close
family member. Id § 1229a(e)(1).
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motion to reopen filed at any time if the alien demonstrates that the
alien did not receive notice in accordance with . .. section 1229(a)."'
This Comment focuses on the 180-day filing deadline for an appeal
based on exceptional circumstances.'
C. Approaches to the Filing Deadline for
Exceptional Circumstances
The courts' current views are quite fractious regarding equitable
tolling's propriety in the in absentia context.
1. The Eleventh Circuit refuses to toll the filing deadline.
In Anin v Reno,"6 an alien entered the United States on an "alien
in transit" visa that allowed him to remain in the country for only one
day.7 He did not comply with his visa; in fact, he got married, and
three years later filed for asylum and permanent residency 
status. 4
Upon learning that Anin violated his visa's conditions, the INS sent
notice of his deportation hearing to his attorney of record.9 Someone
in the attorney's office signed the certified mail receipt, but neither
Anin nor his attorney attended the hearing, and the attorney claimed
he never received notice." Anin was ordered deported in absentia and
taken into custody.
Meanwhile, Anin's attorney informed Anin that he would be able
to reopen the case, and he filed an appeal predicated on lack of no-
tice." The Immigration Judge held against Anin, but his attorney did
not inform him of the adverse decision, and he discovered it only after
the 180-day filing deadline had lapsed.' Anin requested that the
Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") toll the filing deadline based
on ineffective assistance of counsel (an alleged "exceptional circum-
stance"), but it rejected his plea."
4 Id § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).
45 Since there is no deadline for an appeal on the grounds of improper service, the equita-
ble tolling doctrine discussed in this Comment has no potential application to those cases.









55 Id. 8 USC § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i) states that an in absentia deportation order "may be re-
scinded only upon a motion to reopen filed within 180 days after the date of the order of re-
moval if the alien demonstrates that the failure to appear was because of exceptional circum-
stances."
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On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that Section 1229a's 180-day
filing deadline is "jurisdictional and mandatory,"'6 and therefore af-
firmed the BIA's denial of Anin's motion to reopen. Anin's jurisdic-
tional interpretation adheres to the logic of most BIA decisions, which
typically hold that when an alien files a tardy appeal, courts cannot en-
tertain it."
2. The First Circuit is receptive to arguments favoring tollability,
but stresses a petitioner's diligence in pursuing his claim.
Two other circuits have refused to follow the Eleventh Circuit's
lead. In Jobe v INS," the petitioner was an alien who spoke no Eng-
lish.'9 He had authorization to stay in the United States for one month,
but instead he stayed for approximately four, at which time he volun-
tarily contacted the INS and applied for political asylum.6 0 The INS
denied his application and referred his case to an IJ for deportation
61 6proceedings. Jobe, through an intermediary," contacted an attorney
to represent him at the hearing. The attorney requested a change of
venue, and shortly before the hearing, he told Jobe that the court had
granted the motion.?
In reality, the court had denied the motion, and when neither
Jobe nor his attorney attended the hearing, the IJ issued an in absentia
deportation order. Jobe alleged that he knew nothing of this order
until he filed an application to renew his employment authorization, at
which time he could not retain new counsel and file an appeal before
the 180-day deadline lapsed.6'
The BIA dismissed Jobe's appeal, but a First Circuit panel, after
extensive statutory analysis, explicitly rejected Anin's logic6 and held
56 Anin, 188 F3d at 1278.
57 See In re Lei, Interim Dec 3356, 1998 BIA LEXIS 23, *8 (reasoning that "[h]ad Congress
intended to provide for an exception to the 180-day time limit based on the ineffective assistance
of counsel, it could have done so"); In re A-A-, Interim Dec 3357, 1998 BIA LEXIS 22, *6 (hold-
ing that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does not constitute an exception to the 180-
day filing deadline). The BIA hears appeals from Immigration Judges, and its decisions are ap-
pealed to the federal circuit court in whose jurisdiction the underlying events occurred.
58 238 F3d 96 (1st Cir 2001) (en banc).
59 Id at 98.
60 Id at 97.
61 Id.
62 Because Jobe could not read, write, or speak English, he contacted a friend from his na-
tive country to arrange for legal representation. The friend retained an American attorney on




66 The initial opinion explained that Anin's "assertion that [§ 1229a's] time limit is jurisdic-
tional does not rest on any authority .... Nor does Anin contain any analysis of the statutory lan-
guage." Jobe v INS, 2000 US App LEXIS 11607, *21 (1st Cir), withdrawn upon rehearing en
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that if "ineffective assistance of counsel can be [an] 'exceptional cir-
cumstance[ ]' excusing failure to appear,.., in 'exceptional cases' it
can also excuse failure to file a timely motion to reopen."" Thus, it
held that courts can equitably toll the filing deadline and remanded
the case for further consideration of whether the ineffective assistance
warranted such tolling."
The INS then sought and received a rehearing en banc, and the
court withdrew the initial panel opinion.6 In the rehearing, the major-
ity found that Jobe received oral notice of his deportation hearing
through his friend only a month after the in absentia proceeding." It
therefore held that despite his attorney's dereliction, Jobe's failure to
take action "for more than half a year" following oral notice "conclu-
sively establishes that [he] was insufficiently diligent ... to warrant the
provision of any equitable relief."71 The court did not reach the ques-
tion of whether the equitable tolling doctrine applies to Section 1229a.
The vigorous dissent, penned by the judge who wrote the initial
panel opinion, argued that it is not "fair or just to deport an individual
and put his life in danger on the basis of appellate fact-finding," and
urged tolling on the same grounds as in the previous opinion.72 The
majority signaled its receptiveness to that possibility in future cases,
observing that the INS's jurisdictional argument "is skillfully coun-
tered ... by our dissenting brothers [and] the Massachusetts Law Re-
form Institute, which filed a well argued amicus brief."3 Given an ap-
propriately diligent petitioner, the First Circuit might well decline to
follow the Eleventh Circuit's jurisdictional lead.
banc, 238 F3d 96. It concluded that "Lopez [is] more persuasive than Anin." Jobe, 2000 US App
LEXIS 11607 at *21.
67 Jobe, 2000 US App LEXIS 11607 at *24-25.
68 Id at *27. The Second Circuit also rejected Anin's logic in Iavorski v INS, 232 F3d 124
(2d Cir 2000). In that case, the alien attended his hearing, but his attorney failed to file the prom-
ised appeal within the 90-day time limit established in 8 USC § 1229a(c)(6)(A), the counterpart
to the in absentia provision, lavorski, 232 F3d at 127. Although Iavorski did not concern an in ab-
sentia appeal, it nonetheless noted that Anin's finding of a jurisdictional limit in the sister statute
was "without explanation," id at 130 n 5, and held that the "accommodation for exceptional cases
is irreconcilable [ ] with the strict application that would be required of a jurisdictional limita-
tion." Id at 132.
69 Jobe, 238 F3d at 99.
70 Id at 100-01.
71 Idat 101.
72 Id at 106.
73 Id at 99-100.
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3. The Ninth Circuit considers a representative's fraud sufficient
to toll the filing deadline.
Finally, in a pre-Anin case, Lopez v INS,' a notary public posing
as an immigration attorney defrauded an alien, who did not recognize
the deceit until after the filing deadline had lapsed." The Ninth Cir-
cuit, following the approach rejected in Anin, explained that "where a
plaintiff has been injured by fraud and 'remains in ignorance of it
without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of
the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered.'7. It
then held that "the statute of limitations to reopen an order of depor-
tation is equitably tolled where the alien's late petition is the result of
the deceptive actions by a notary posing as an attorney.""
Thus, among the three circuits to address the question of when
courts should equitably toll Section 1229a's filing deadline, there are
three degrees of tolling support. The Eleventh Circuit holds that the
deadline is a non-tollable jurisdictional limit; the First Circuit indicates
that the deadline might be tollable if a petitioner is suitably diligent;
and the Ninth Circuit holds that alleged fraud is one clearly sufficient
reason to toll.
II. THE 180-DAY APPEALS DEADLINE IS PROPERLY VIEWED AS A
TOLLABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATION
Although Anin held that Section 1229a is a jurisdictional limit,
Supreme Court precedent and statutory interpretation demonstrate
that it is better viewed as a tollable statute of limitation. In Irwin v
Department of Veterans Affairs,8 the Court noted that there is a "re-
buttable presumption" that equitable tolling applies to federal stat-
utes," and nothing in the INA rebuts this presumption. The statute
contains no specific tolling provision, suggesting that Congress did not
want to override the normal pro-tolling presumption, nor does the
statute contain detailed or emphatic language. Indeed, it is linguisti-
cally similar to numerous other statutes that courts have held equita-
bly tollable.
Similarly, the legislative history and statutory purpose evince no
congressional intent to limit courts' equitable powers. The history
demonstrates a clear concern with prosecutorial fairness and individ-
ual equities, and while the statute's purpose includes preventing collu-
74 184 F3d 1097 (9th Cir 1999).
75 Id at 1099.
76 Id at 1100, quoting Holmberg v Armbrecht, 327 US 392,397 (1946).
77 Lopez, 184 F3d at 1100.
78 498 US 89 (1990).
79 Id at 95-96.
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sive obstruction, Congress did not intend to limit courts' presumed
powers to redress injustice. Given this evidence, Anin's jurisdictional
conclusion seems mistaken.
A. Classifying the Filing Deadline As Jurisdictional or Prudential
Before an Article III court may hear a case on its merits, it must
satisfy itself of its subject matter jurisdiction. It is therefore critical to
determine whether Section 1229a's filing deadline is a jurisdictional
limit or merely a prudential statute of limitations. If the deadline is a
jurisdictional limit, Congress has not granted courts the power to ad-
judicate claims beyond that date, and tolling the deadline to reach an
appeal's merits would thus raise serious constitutional concerns. If the
deadline is merely a prudential statute of limitations, however, equita-
ble tolling is possible since it implicates no expansion of judicial
power.
Since courts cannot toll jurisdictional deadlines, a congressional
intent to allow tolling would strongly suggest hat Congress did not in-
tend to restrict courts' jurisdiction. Congressional intent is thus of cen-
tral concern, and the Court has provided guidance for interpreting it
in this context. In United States v Locke," the Court noted that
"[s]tatutory filing deadlines are generally subject to the defense of...
equitable tolling," and because Congress is aware of this, there is a
"rebuttable presumption" that equitable tolling applies to suits against
both private defendants and the United States.w
Most recently, in United States v Brockamp, M the Court succinctly
summarized the state of the law. A court confronting the issue of
whether a filing deadline is tollable must ask Irwin's negatively
phrased question: "Is there good reason to believe that Congress did
not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply?""
Anin did not explain its jurisdictional reasoning, and the court of
appeals case on which it relied, Kamara v INS," provides scant support
for its position. In Kamara, the Eighth Circuit held that the BIA "did
not err" in denying as time barred a tardy motion to reopen.' The
court nowhere termed the deadline jurisdictional, nor did it hold that
80 See Ruhrgas AG v Marathon Oil Co, 526 US 574, 577 (1999) (noting that Article III
courts must have subject matter jurisdiction before they may entertain a suit on its merits).
81 See Rotella v Wood, 528 US 549,560 (2000) (noting the settled "understanding that fed-
eral statutes of limitations are generally subject to equitable principles of tolling").
82 471 US 84 (1985).
83 Id at 94n 10.
84 Irwin, 498 US at 95-96.
85 519 US 347 (1997).
86 Id at 350.
87 149 F3d 904 (8th Cir 1998).
88 Idat906.
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equitable modification was beyond its power. As such, Anin's jurisdic-
tional holding goes far beyond Kamara's, and neither opinion defends
its ultra-formalistic statutory interpretation in a setting where the
Court normally presumes equitable powers.
B. There Is Little Textual Evidence That Congress Intended to
Foreclose Equitable Tolling
With the "tolling presumption" in mind, the next step is to evalu-
ate Section 1229a's 180-day filing deadline to determine whether
Congress intended to foreclose equitable tolling. Although courts his-
torically employed a substance-procedure dichotomy to evaluate eq-
uity's proper role in a statute,n the modern approach is to evaluate
congressional intent.'O In doing so, courts "consider[ ] the language of
the statute, [its] legislative history, and [its] statutory purpose."91
The first step, then, in deciding whether courts can toll the 180-
day deadline, is to examine the language in Section 1229a." As the
Court stated in Locke, "with respect to filing deadlines a literal read-
ing of Congress' words is generally the only proper reading of those
words."" The statute merely says that a deportation order "may be re-
scinded only upon [an 'exceptional circumstances'] motion to reopen
filed within 180 days after the date of the order of removal."" This
language does not suggest a congressional intent clear enough to
override the presumption that courts retain equitable powers."
Section 1229a's language is also not very emphatic, simply em-
ploying the word "only" as a limiting factor." This is suggestive, be-
cause "[t]he presence of especially emphatic language in a time limita-
tion can be determinative of congressional intent to disallow equitable
modification. It follows that the absence of such language, while not
89 See David D. Doran, Comment, Equitable Tolling of Statutory Benefit Time Limitations:
A Congressional Intent Analysis, 64 Wash L Rev 681, 684 (1989) (describing the evolution of eq-
uity's role in statutory analysis). See also Burnett v New York Central Railroad Co, 380 US 424,
426-27 n 2 (1965) (discussing procedural-substantive dichotomy).
90 See Doran, Comment, 64 Wash L Rev at 686 (cited in note 89).
91 Miller v New Jersey State Department of Corrections, 145 F3d 616,618 (3d Cir 1998), cit-
ing Shendock v Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 893 F2d 1458, 1462-64 (3d
Cir 1990).
92 See Good Samaritan Hospital v Shalala, 508 US 402, 409 (1993) ("The starting point in
interpreting a statute is its language, for if the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter."); Davis v Johnson, 158 F3d 806, 810-11 (5th Cir 1998) ("The clearest indication of con-
gressional intent is the words of the statute itself.").
93 471 US at 93.
94 8 USC § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i).
95 See text accompanying notes 83-86. See also Hecht Co v Bowles, 321 US 321,330 (1944)
(expressing the Court's belief that "if Congress desired to make [] an abrupt departure from
traditional equity practice[ 1, it would have made its desire plain").
96 "Such an order may be rescinded only upon a motion filed within 180 days." 8 USC
§ 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i).
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dispositive, is one factor suggesting an intent to allow equitable modi-
fication."'
Paralleling this lack of emphasis is a lack of detail. This suggests
that Congress likely intended courts to interpret the statute with the
usual presumptions. In Brockamp, for example, the Supreme Court
held that very detailed statutory language that "linguistically speaking,
cannot easily be read as containing explicit exceptions" can signal ju-
risdictional intent.8 The Court, however, also held that the opposite
can be true, suggesting that a statute requiring a claim to be filed
"within 90 days of receipt of notice of final action" might contain an
implied equitable tolling exception."
Finally, analogy to other interpreted statutes yields strong support
for equitable tolling. In Burnett v New York Central Railroad Co,'° the
Supreme Court held tollable a statute providing that "no action shall
be maintained ... unless commenced within three years from the day
the cause of action accrued."'0' Similarly, in William G. Tadlock Con-
struction v United States Department of Defense,'m the Ninth Circuit
held tollable a statute providing that a "complaint may not be filed
more than 180 days after the later of the date on which the violation is
alleged to have occurred or was discovered.'' .3 Both of these statues
seem linguistically similar to Section 1229a, and both were held to al-
low equitable modification. Section 1229a's mere "exceptional circum-
stance" language cannot transform a statute of limitations into a juris-
dictional bar.
One might challenge this conclusion of tollability in three ways,
though none is persuasive. The first is that because Congress provided
a 180-day appeal window, it might have intended this to be the exclu-
sive concession to equity."'° Under this view, if Congress had intended
courts to use their presumed equitable powers, it would have explicitly
97 Cynthia Reed, Note, Time Limits for Federal Employees under Title VII: Jurisdictional
Prerequisites or Statutes of Limitation?, 74 Minn L Rev 1371,1399-1400 (1990) (discussing statu-
tory interpretation in the Title VII context).
98 519 US at 350.
99 Id.
100 380 US 424 (1965).
101 Id at 426, quoting 45 USC § 56 (1994) (providing the limitations period under the Fed-
eral Employer's Liability Act).
102 91 F3d 1335 (9th Cir 1996).
103 Id at 1340 (concerning an action under former 10 USC § 2409a).
104 See, for example, United States v Beggerly, 524 US 38,48 (1998) (holding that by provid-
ing that the statute of limitations will not begin to run until the plaintiff "knew or should have
known of the claim of the United States," Congress already effectively allowed for equitable toll-
ing). The statute at issue in Beggerly is materially different from Section 1229a, because unlike
Section 1229a, it requires a plaintiff to have a subjective awareness of his cause of action before
the statute of limitations begins to run. In such situations, courts might more easily conclude that
since Congress ensured a plaintiff's claim will not be time barred absent some neglect on his
part, it intended to foreclose further equitable measures.
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allowed for equitable modification of the deadline where justice so
requires.
There is no particular reason why this reasoning should hold,
however. After all, the very existence of the appeal section indicates
that Congress was at least somewhat concerned with equity, and the
legislative history makes this concern explicit.1°O It is therefore equally
plausible that Congress intended the appeal window to be a minimum
guarantee of equity.'6
The second possible attack on Congress's "equitable intent" is the
common refrain that if Congress wanted the deadline to be tollable, it
would have stated so explicitly. The BIA subscribes to this analysis in
construing Section 1229a,'° but it is a very tenuous interpretation. The
Supreme Court has cautioned against using precisely this kind of
negative inferential reasoning because such "excursion[s] into ex-
trapolation of legislative intent are most often entirely unilluminat-
ing."'' Indeed, given Irwin's stated assumption that courts can equita-
bly toll absent language to the contrary, Congress's omission might
simply reflect the application of legislative economy.
Lastly, an expressio unius interpretation might suggest that since
the INA considers timely a motion to reopen "filed at any time if the
alien demonstrates that the alien did not receive notice,"'° Congress's
failure to include similar flexibility for "exceptional circumstance" ap-
peals evinces its intent to deny all such motions. This is highly unlikely
given Irwin's tolling presumption-if Congress wished to restrict
courts' jurisdiction, it would not have expressed that intent only
through subtle linguistic differentiation."' Moreover, even if Congress
expected courts to use expressio unius logic to hold tardy appeals
meritless, that does not imply that Congress intended to restrict
courts' jurisdiction to entertain such motions. Quite the opposite, if
Congress wanted lower courts to deny tardy appeals on their merits, it
must have intended that lower courts have jurisdiction to reach those
merits. Generally, then, the statutory language does little to rebut the
presumption that the filing deadline is a statute of limitations rather
than a jurisdictional limit, and this in turn suggests that courts have
the power equitably to toll the 180-day filing deadline.
105 See Part II.C.
106 See Jobe, 2000 US App LEXIS 11607 at *14-15 (noting that statutory language might be
an "equitable safety valve provision").
107 In reA-A-, Interim Dec 3357, 1998 BIA LEXIS 22, *8.
108 Calderon v United States District Court for the Central District of California, 128 F3d
1283, 1289 (9th Cir 1997), quoting Cort v Ash, 422 US 66,83 n 14 (1975).
109 8 USC § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).
110 See note 95.
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C. The INA's Legislative History Evinces a Congressional Desire for
Equity, Rather Than an Intent to Curb Courts' Equitable Powers
Although the INA's legislative history is somewhat scant, it also
supports the idea that the filing deadline is a tollable statute of limita-
tions. Equity clearly concerned the Conference Committee during the
Act's 1990 revision,"' The conferees explained that they "expect that
in determining whether an alien's failure to appear was justifiable the
Attorney General will look at the totality of the circumstances to de-
termine whether the alien could not reasonably have been expected to
appear.'.. Similarly, in the Conference on the original 1952 Act, the
record states that "the conferees have refined the language so as to
make it emphatically clear that the Attorney General may not ... ca-
priciously deport an alien solely on the basis of inconsequential, un-
witting infraction[s] of the law."'"3
Strictly speaking, neither conference report discusses the equita-
ble powers of courts to toll a filing deadline; instead, both concern
themselves with ensuring evenhanded prosecution. This may suggest
that Congress preferred for the Justice Department to exercise prose-
cutorial discretion rather than for the judiciary to exercise adjudica-
tive discretion. Given the Court's past equitable presumptions and
Congress's clear desire to prevent inequity, however, it is more likely
that Congress was concerned that prosecutorial discretion would be
insufficient to check the harshness of deportation. Indeed, the mere
fact that the history does not mention jurisdiction may suggest that
Congress did not wish to limit courts' equitable powers."' Thus, far
from foreclosing Congress's intent to allow equitable tolling, the
legislative history signals a strong congressional concern for ensuring
I11 A recent legislation treatise notes that committee reports "should be considered as au-
thoritative legislative history and should be given great weight .... Most legislation is essentially
written in committee or subcommittee, and any collective statement by the members of that sub-
group will represent the best-informed thought about what the proposed legislation is doing."
William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip . Frickey, Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the
Creation of Public Policy 743 (West 2d ed 1995). For example, in Schwegmann Brothers v Calvert
Distillers Corp, 341 US 384, 395 (1951) (Jackson concurring), Justice Jackson objected generally
to the use of legislative materials as interpretive tools, but he excepted committee reports from
his quarrel.
112 Immigration Act of 1990, Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference,
HR Rep No 101-955, 101st Cong, 2d Sess 132 (Oct 26, 1990), reprinted in 1990 USCCAN 6797.
113 Immigration and Nationality Act, Conference Report, HR Rep No 82-2096, 82d Cong,
2d Sess (June 9, 1952), in 98 Cong Rec H 6986 (June 10, 1952), reprinted in 1952 USCCAN 1754,
1754.
114 See Miller v New Jersey State Department of Corrections, 145 F3d 616,618 (3d Cir 1998)
(concluding that where congressional conference report did not refer to jurisdiction and various
members of Congress referred to the period as a statute of limitations, habeas corpus statute was
subject to equitable tolling).
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broad equitable treatment and evenhanded prosecution in deporta-
tion proceedings.
D. The INA's Statutory Purpose Does Not Imply an Intent to Curb
Courts' Equitable Powers
Finally, like its text and history, the INA's statutory purpose does
not suggest a congressional intent to curb courts' equitable powers.
The in absentia deportation procedure was developed in the original
Act in order to prevent obstructionist tactics,"5 and the Conference
Report to the 1990 amendments recognizes that "willful and unjustifi-
able failure to attend deportation hearings that have been properly
noticed is intolerable....6 The BIA concludes from this evidence that
Congress's concern with obstructionist tactics evinces an "intent to
bring finality to in absentia deportation proceedings."... The implicit
logic is that since the in absentia procedure is designed to bring final-
ity and prevent stalling tactics, Congress likely did not intend to allow
courts to undermine that finality by equitably tolling the deadline for
filing an appeal.
This logic is ultimately unconvincing. Congress's intent to bring
closure to deportation proceedings is an argument on the merits
against tolling generally, but it hardly constitutes clear evidence that
Congress intended to restrict courts' power to hear legitimately tardy
appeals. There is a significant qualitative difference between allowing
the Attorney General to proceed in absentia against aliens who refuse
to appear despite proper service, and restricting courts' power to hear
appeals that are tardy only due to fraud or attorney incompetence.""
Finally, although there are often compelling purposive reasons
why Congress would make a deadline a jurisdictional limit instead of a
statute of limitations, no such reason is persuasive in the deportation
setting. For example, in Brockamp, the Supreme Court held that the
115 See Report from the Committee on the Judiciary, HR Rep No 82-1365, 82d Cong, 2d
Sess 57 (Feb 14,1952), reprinted in 1952 USCCAN 1712-13:
Orderly administrative processes have at imes been interrupted and subjected to unneces-
sary delays because aliens, without legitimate cause, refused to attend scheduled hearings or
insisted upon leaving at their own pleasure and without other than contumacious reasons.
The Government should have authority to proceed to a final decision in the face of such
obstructionist tactics.
116 Report from the Committee on the Judiciary, HR Rep No 101-681, 101st Cong, 2d Sess
150 (Sept 5, 1990), reprinted in 1990 USCCAN 6556. See also Romero-Morales v INS, 25 F3d
125, 128 (2d Cir 1994) (discussing the statutory purpose of the INA's 1990 amendments).
117 In reA-A-, Interim Dec 3357,1998 BIA LEXIS 22, *6.
118 See, for example, Lopez, 184 F3d at 1097 (concerning a notary public fraudulently pos-
ing as an attorney skilled in immigration law); Jobe, 238 F3d at 63 (concerning an attorney who
assumed that a motion for change of venue would be granted, and instructed his client that he
need not attend the originally scheduled hearing).
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equitable power to toll a tax filing deadline could not be read into the
Internal Revenue Code."9 It reasoned that Congress wished to protect
itself against stale monetary claims,"O and to allow tolling would be to
subject the IRS to the immense administrative difficulties inherent in
responding to millions of claims annually.'2' The Court also noted that
"[t]ax law ... is not normally characterized by case-specific exceptions
reflecting individualized equities."'
Similarly, in United States v Beggerly,' the Supreme Court held
that the Quiet Title Act's filing deadline was a jurisdictional limit." '
Key to its reasoning was that "[i]t is of special importance that land-
owners know what their rights are, and the period during which those
rights may be subject to challenge. Equitable tolling ... would throw a
cloud of uncertainty over these rights.". These situations clearly re-
flect the previously discussed"6 tolling tradeoff between ensuring indi-
vidual equities, on the one hand, and preserving potential defendants'
"right[s] to be free of stale claims"'27 on the other.
The arguments favoring finality in tax, quiet title, and bankruptcy
settings are not equally persuasive in deportation cases. Unlike tax
law, immigration law is undeniably concerned with individual circum-
stances: the Conference Report in 1990 emphasized that "the Attor-
ney General will look at the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether the alien could not reasonably have been expected to ap-
pear.""8 This language clearly contemplates examining the facts in
each individual case.
Moreover, unlike in quiet title and bankruptcy proceedings, the
government has no pressing need to protect itself from stale deporta-
tion claims. In a quiet title action, for example, the government has a
clear need to know when its land is no longer subject to a potential
adverse claim. Deportation proceedings typically do not implicate sig-
121
nificant physical or monetary claims against the government, so
119 519 US at 353-54.
120 Id at 353.
121 Id at 352.
122 Id.
123 524 US 38 (1998).
124 Id at 42-49.
125 Id at 49. See also Schunck v Santos, 112 BR 1001,1006 (BAP 9th Cir 1990), quoting In re
Harrison, 71 BR 457,459 (Bankr D Minn 1987) (finding that bankruptcy filing limits are not tol-
lable because they serve "the 'fresh start' goals of bankruptcy relief [that allow] a debtor to 'en-
joy finality and certainty in relief from financial distress as quickly as possible"').
126 See text accompanying notes 13-16.
127 Burnett, 380 US at 428.
128 HR Rep No 101-955 at 132 (cited in note 112) (emphasis added).
129 Although it is possible that an alien may receive welfare benefits or other resources, this
additional claim likely will be minor in the case of a short-term missed deadline. In no circuit
case on this subject does a court concern itself with this potential outlay.
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Congress's need to ensure finality is not as pressing. At worst, the
alien may remain in the country for longer than he might have other-
wise, but the potential inconvenience from this extended stay does not
convincingly outweigh Congress's explicit desire to take account of
individual circumstances in deportation proceedings.O As the Second
Circuit recently explained, "immigration law in general possesses no
special [limited] status where equitable tolling is concerned .... In-
deed, the more far-reaching equitable remedy of granting relief nunc
pro tunc in certain exceptional cases has long been available under
immigration law.. 3' If Congress intended to break from this equitable
tradition, it would likely have stressed that intent.
III. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION: COURTS SHOULD TOLL THE 180-DAY
FILING DEADLINE ONLY IF AN ALIEN'S ATTORNEY
AFFIRMATIVELY MISLEADS HIM
Many of the cases that come before the Board of Immigration
Appeals involve situations where an alien alleges that he was not in-
formed of the date of his initial deportation hearing.' This is not usu-
ally the INS's fault, at least not directly; rather, the INS often sends
notice to an alien's attorney of record, and the attorney sometimes
fails accurately to disseminate that information to his client. "' In some
of these cases, the attorney fails to convey any notice at all, and in
such circumstances, it would be surprising for an alien to learn of the
missed hearing in time to meet the appeal deadline.
In other cases, an alien's attorney conveys the original notice to
the alien, but he subsequently misinforms him of material facts relat-
ing to that hearing. Sometimes this is clear fraud,'M such as in Lopez,
where a notary public posing as an attorney told his "client" that he
need not attend his hearing.' Lopez had received independent no-tice, ' but he trusted the fraudulent advice. In many such misinforma-
130 See text accompanying note 112.
131 lavorski v INS, 232 F3d 124, 130 n 4 (2d Cir 2000), citing Batanic v INS, 12 F3d 662,667-
68 (7th Cir 1993) (permitting submission of otherwise barred application for asylum).
132 See, for example, In re A-A-, Interim Dec 3357, 1998 BIA LEXIS 22, *2-3 (concerning
situation where respondent claimed he never received notice from his attorney).
133 See id (noting that someone in the attorney's office had signed the notice's certified mail
receipt); In re Lei, Interim Dec 3356, 1998 BIA LEXIS 23 (concerning a similar situation where
an attorney allegedly received notice of the original hearing, but not the rescheduled hearing).
134 To the extent that aliens may be less familiar with the English language and American
judicial system than are American citizens, they might be particularly deferential to attorney ad-
vice and thus more vulnerable to fraud of this kind.
135 184 F3d at 1099.
136 Id.
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tion cases, however, the attorney simply predicates his advice on a
negligent procedural mistake.'3
This Comment proposes that when the INS properly serves no-
tice but an alien does not attend his deportation hearing, courts should
draw a misfeasance-nonfeasance distinction and equitably toll only if
the alien alleges that his attorney made material misrepresentations
that proximately caused his absence and failure to file a timely appeal.
Under this approach, courts should toll regardless of whether the al-
leged misinformation is due to attorney fraud or negligence, but alle-
gations of a nonfeasant failure to relay notice should not warrant toll-
ing.
A. An Attorney's Misfeasance Has Severe Consequences That
Should Justify Tolling the Filing Deadline
Mere attorney negligence is not usually considered an "excep-
tional circumstance" justifying rescission of an in absentia deportation
order.'m As discussed in Part I, the INA explains that an "exceptional
circumstance" is one "such as serious illness of the alien or serious ill-
ness or death of the spouse, child, or parent of the alien, but not in-
cluding less compelling circumstances," and mandates that the circum-
stances be "beyond the control of the alien.'. 9
Since an exceptional circumstance must be beyond the alien's
control, not just any situation is sufficient to justify equitable tolling.
Statutes of limitations are harsh by nature,'" and judges cannot soften
this harsh outcome out of mere sympathy.'4' Courts have themselves
employed equitable tolling only grudgingly-the Supreme Court has
held that the principle "do[es] not extend to what is at best a garden
variety claim of excusable neglect,"'42 and other courts have held that
ignorance of legal rights, 13 illiteracy,'" and lack of representation' are
insufficient bases for tolling.
137 See, for example, Patel v INS, 803 F2d 804, 806 (5th Cir 1986) (concerning a situation
where an attorney suggested that an alien need not attend his deportation hearing based on the
attorney's expectation that his motion for a continuance would be granted).
138 See Taliani v Chrans, 189 F3d 597,598 (7th Cir 1999) (Posner) ("Normally, [] a lawyer's
mistake is not a valid basis for equitable tolling.").
139 8 USC § 1229a(e)(1).
140 Parker and Colella, 29 Seton Hall L Rev at 886 (cited in note 11) ("Limitation periods
are by their very nature harsh because they cut off a person's rights without regard to the merits
of the claim.").
141 See Locke, 471 US at 95 ("Nor is the Judiciary licensed to attempt to soften the clear
import of Congress' chosen words whenever a court believes those words lead to a harsh re-
sult.").
142 Irwin, 498 US at 96.
143 See Larson v American Wheel and Brake, Inc, 610 F2d 506, 510-11 (8th Cir 1979) (con-
cluding a defendant was entitled to summary judgment where the plaintiff failed to file a timely
notice of intent to sue with the Secretary of Labor).
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A primary reason for judicial reluctance to toll is that tolling has
the strong potential to encourage obstructionist tactics.'46 If minor at-
torney error is sufficient to invoke equitable tolling, the attorney and
client might collusively obstruct proceedings by intentionally commit-
ting minor errors in order to gain time.47 Indeed, there is clear evi-
dence that the drafters of the original Act intended to eradicate such
tactics.'6
Despite these valid reservations,14 '9 however, courts have consid-
ered cases of active attorney misrepresentation to be "exceptional cir-
cumstances" justifying rescission of an order. In In re Grialva,n for
example, an alien's attorney called on the morning of his hearing and
falsely told him that the court had granted a continuance.'' The BIA
had no trouble finding that "the level of incompetence ... establishes
that the respondent's absence was the result of exceptional circum-
stances .... [He] was blatantly misled regarding his need to appear at
the scheduled hearing.'' .2 If such attorney conduct excuses an alien's
failure to appear at the original deportation hearing, it seems only ap-
propriate that active misrepresentation should also be grounds for eq-
uitably tolling the deadline for filing exceptional circumstance appeals.
There are several reasons for this conclusion, but the clearest is based
upon result. Courts traditionally view deportation as a civil proceed-
ing," and as such, a potential deportee's rights are not nearly as exten-
sive as a criminal defendant's.M  This view, however, undervalues de-
portation's incredible harshness and punitive nature. As the Supreme
144 See Barrow v New Orleans Steamship Association, 932 F2d 473, 478 (5th Cir 1991)
(concluding that since ignorance of legal rights does not toll statute of limitations, it is irrelevant
whether that ignorance was due to illiteracy).
145 See James v United States Postal Service, 835 F2d 1265, 1267 (8th Cir 1988) (concluding
that where noncompliance with statute of limitations results from claimant's inability to find a
lawyer or unfamiliarity with legal process, there is no justification for equitable relief).
146 See INS v Rios-Pineda, 471 US 444,450 (1985) (noting "incentive for stalling").
147 See In re Rivera, I & N Dec 599,604 (BIA 1996) (protecting against attorney-client ob-
structive collusion).
148 See note 115.
149 See Part III.C for a discussion of why collusive obstruction is not a compelling concern.
150 In re Grijalva, Interim Dec 3284,1996 BIA LEXIS 22.
151 ld at*3.
152 Id at *6.
153 See note 36.
154 Robert Pauw explains:
[A] person facing deportation does not have a right of trial by jury; there is no Sixth
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel; the exclusionary rule under the Fourth
Amendment does not apply; the Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply; no limits to deporta-
tion are imposed by virtue of the Double Jeopardy Clause; the Eighth Amendment's prohi-
bition against cruel and unusual punishment is not relevant; and the Bill of Attainder
Clause does not apply.
Pauw, 52 Admin L Rev at 309-10 (cited in note 36).
1084 [68:1065
In Absentia Deportation Orders
Court itself has recognized, "[deportation] visits a great hardship on
the individual and deprives him of the right to stay and live and work
in this land of freedom. That deportation is a penalty-at times a most
serious one-cannot be doubted."'' . Another court agreed, asking
rhetorically,
How can deportation of an alien legally residing in the United
States be considered anything but punishment? [The] petitioner
stands to lose his residence, livelihood, and most importantly, his
family. Certainly if the same thing occurred to a United States
citizen a court would not hesitate to call it punishment-
moreover, cruel and unusual punishment." '
Given deportation's overwhelming seriousness, grave conse-
quences, and explicitly recognized penal nature,"' equitable safeguards
are plainly necessary. The Supreme Court has expressed concern with
a lay citizen's ability to mount an effective pro se legal defense.' If a
typical American citizen cannot effectively defend himself, an alien
who may have less familiarity with the language and judicial system is
likely no more capable, and a court should not expect him to assess
accurately his attorney's procedural acumen. If an alien's attorney
tells him that he need not attend a hearing, a court should not penalize
him for heeding that advice, regardless of whether the attorney is
fraudulent or merely negligent. " '
This logic dictates that when an alien alleges that his attorney's
misinformation proximately caused him to miss his hearing and Sec-
tion 1229a's appeals deadline, a court should equitably toll to reach
the merits of whether the ineffective assistance constituted an excep-
tional circumstance. Tolling is thus appropriate in cases such as Patel v
INS,'" where an attorney allegedly informed his client that the court
155 Bridges v Wixon, 326 US 135,154 (1945).
156 Lieggi v INS, 389 F Supp 12, 17 (N D Ill 1975), revd 529 F2d 530 (7th Cir 1976). See also
Pauw, 52 Admin L Rev at 326 (cited in note 36); Jack Wasserman, Grounds and Procedures
Relating to Deportation, 13 San Diego L Rev 125,128 (1975) ("Our immigration statute exhibits
an unyielding, unforgiving and vengeful attitude toward those who have sinned and been
rehabilitated.").
157 See text accompanying notes 155-56.
158 See Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335,344 (1963), quoting Powell v Alabama, 287 US 45,
68-69 (1932):
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the
right to be heard by counsel.... [A layman] lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately
to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.
159 This admittedly raises the specter of potential collusion, but Part III.C suggests that this
is not of compelling concern.
160 803 F2d 804 (5th Cir 1986).
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would automatically grant a continuance,' and Lopez, where a notary
public allegedly defrauded an alien and told him not to attend his
hearing."2 This approach allows for equitable considerations without
giving rise to the problems that statutes of limitations are designed to
avoid.
B. Reconciling Limited Tolling with the INA's Notice Provision
Some might claim that since serving notice to an attorney is tan-
tamount to serving his client, any tolling is improper if the INS prop-
erly serves an alien's attorney. This argument has some textual sup-
port. First, the INA states that "[i]n removal proceedings under [Sec-
tion 1229a], written notice shall be given in person to the alien (or, if
personal service is not practicable, through service by mail to the alien
or to the alien's counsel of record)."' ' Second, the Code of Federal
Regulations ("CFR") provides that "[w]henever a person is required
... to give or be given notice ... such notice ... shall be given by or to
... the attorney or representative of record, or the person himself if
unrepresented.""
The entire point of equitable tolling, however, is that it allows
equitable intervention to avoid prejudice that falls outside the existing
statutory framework. Congress clearly wished to prevent aliens from
being deported "solely on the basis of inconsequential, unwitting in-
fraction[s] of the law,"'' . and few things seem less witting than an
alien's failure to attend a hearing because his attorney so instructed
him. Especially given deportation's overwhelming harshness,'6 such
situations seem ripe for equitable intervention. As one judge argues,
[i]t is difficult to imagine what could be more prejudicial to a
respondent charged with being deportable from the United
States than denial of an opportunity to be present at his
deportation hearing where he might provide any defenses to the
charges against him, or advance any claims he may have for relief
from deportation.'7
This concern is consonant with the INA itself, which provides that an
alien "shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence
against [him], to present evidence on [his] own behalf, and to cross-
161 Id at 806.
162 184 F3d at 1098-99.
163 8 USC § 1229(a)(1). Note that this provision actually prefers service on an alien and al-
lows service on the alien's attorney only when the alien is unreachable.
164 8 CFR § 292.5(a) (2000).
165 See note 113.
166 See text accompanying notes 154-156
167 In re A-A-, Interim Dec 3357, 1998 BIA LEXIS 22, *10-11 (Rosenberg concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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examine witnesses.""" The CFR prefers serving attorneys, but that
should not deter courts from fulfilling their envisioned equitable role
when the system breaks down-indeed, that is the precise purpose of
equitable tolling. '6
C. Collusive Behavior is Not a Substantial Threat
There is, however, some reason to doubt the wisdom of gener-
ously applying equitable tolling to cases of attorney error. One reason
for hesitation is that equitable tolling typically applies only where
there is positive misconduct by the party against whom it is asserted.17
In none of the cited cases involving attorney mistake is the INS di-
rectly at fault; therefore, employing equitable tolling in cases of attor-
ney error would significantly extend the doctrine.
Moreover, this relatively liberal approach to tolling might in-
crease the opportunity for collusion between an alien and his attorney.
Although this is reason for caution, several factors suggest that collu-
sion problems are unlikely to outweigh the need to provide potential
deportees with equitable treatment. First, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, the INS provides for severe penalties, including fines, perma-
nent expulsion from the immigration bar, and recommendation of dis-
barment,7' for a virtual laundry list of unethical, unprofessional, and
frivolous actions, including for any reason "in the public interest.. ' ..
Certainly collusive behavior would merit such sanction. It is unlikely
that any attorney is willing to risk his career simply to delay a deporta-
tion proceeding.
Second, it is unclear precisely what material advantage an attor-
ney and his client would gain from delaying a deportation hearing. To
be sure, an alien might remain in the country beyond 180 days, but it
strains credibility to think that this could be a permanent solution.
Equitably tolling the filing deadline does not allow an alien com-
pletely to avoid a hearing. Especially given the previously discussed
sanctions, it seems unlikely that an attorney would think any minor
gain from delay would outweigh the risk.
168 8 USC § 1229a(b)(4)(B).
169 See Part I.A.
170 See Thomas S. Rue, Admiralty, 45 Mercer L Rev 1175, 1176 (1994), quoting Irwin, 498
US at 96 (explaining that equitable tolling is allowed "where the complainant has been induced
or tricked by his adversary's misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass"); Anderson v
Unisys Corp, 47 F3d 302, 306 (8th Cir 1995) (noting that "[e]quitable tolling arises upon some
positive misconduct by the party against whom it is asserted"); South v Saab Cars USA, Inc, 28
F3d 9, 11 (2d Cir 1994) (explaining that "[t]he doctrine of equitable tolling has ... been applied
where the court has led the plaintiff to believe that she had done all that was required of her").
171 8 CFR § 292.3(a).
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Finally, even assuming some level of collusion occurs, the poten-
tial harm to society does not outweigh the harm to non-colluding
aliens whose lives would be destroyed without a hearing to contest
their deportation. Unlike in many cases where time is of the essence,173
a deportation delay implicates no significant claim on the country's
revenues, land interests, or adverse claims; indeed, it is hard to imagine
how tolling a deportation order might substantially prejudice societal
interests.
Conversely, to restrict tolling for fear of potential collusion would
cause devastating damage to a "good faith" alien whose life is de-
stroyed without so much as a hearing. Equitable tolling does not con-
fer any advantage, unjust reward, or windfall; instead, it simply allows
an alien to file an appeal to contest a decision that may well be the
most important event of his life. It seems arbitrary and needless for an
alien to forfeit his chance to examine witnesses, tell his story, and be
more than a name on a judge's docket, all because he followed his at-
torney's erroneous advice. The in absentia deportation proceeding is
one of the harshest penalties our society imposes; we need not exac-
erbate it by denying trusting aliens the basic right to appeal the deci-
sion.
CONCLUSION
The INA's 180-day filing deadline for contesting in absentia de-
portation orders is best viewed as an equitably tollable statute of limi-
tations, rather than a limit on courts' jurisdiction. Irwin establishes a
presumption that courts should read equitable tolling into all federal
statutes absent contrary congressional intent, and nothing in the INA's
text, legislative history, or purpose suggests that Congress intended to
curb courts' equitable powers in the deportation context. Where an
alien or his attorney receives notice of a deportation hearing, a court
should equitably toll the filing deadline only when an attorney's mis-
feasance proximately causes an alien to miss his hearing and the sub-
sequent appeals deadline.
173 See text accompanying notes 119-28.
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